




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The Rise of Far-Right Parties in Europe: Dimensions and Implications

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Preamble

The European elections (2019-2022) witnessed successive waves of victory of extreme right-wing parties and their occupation of central position in the political map of Europe, as many European countries witnessed a significant economic decline, with the failure of the left and right governments to achieve their political programs and electoral promises. Such a situation pushed the extreme right parties to the forefront of events where nationalist and anti-immigration discourses triumph over the discourses of moderate parties from both left and right parties.

The prosperity and rise of the far right can be attributed to economic, social, cultural and political reasons in many European countries. Which of these factors has more impact on this change is not easy to specify. It is certain that the economic crisis that erupted in 2008 and the subsequent determined pursuit by the EU and national governments of measures to control neoliberal deficits and austerity is one of the key factors behind the rise of far-right parties.

Such economic policies widen the gap between privileged elites and the bulk of the population, but far-right parties and political currents exploit the discontent of broad segments of citizens who suffer at the bottom of the social ladder. The situation is further complicated by social changes that have led to the shrinking of the former industrial working class that traditionally supported the classical left parties.

Cultural changes, particularly the crisis of grand ideologies (especially on the left, with its transformative aspirations) have led to the spread of individualistic, divisive and satirical views of reality throughout European society⁽¹⁾.

This paper attempts to explain the reasons for the spread of ideas and the victory of far-right parties in Europe, the implications of this phenomenon on the institutional structures within the European Union, the public policies followed by these governments and their ability to find social and economic solutions for their societies? It also addresses the impact of this rise on the European Union project, which has long entered into a policy of eastward expansion and polarization of Eastern European countries?


Furthermore, it investigates the impact of this rise on the performance of the European Parliament as a central legislative body in the European Union, especially as the number of Italian legislators is high compared to the number of the population, particularly with regard to the immigration file, and its potential impact on other geographical regions, especially the Middle East and North Africa region, that may be affected by the racist policies of the extreme right, specifically on issues of immigration, settlement and integration.

(1) Cesáreo Rodríguez-Aguilera, The Rise of The Far Right in Europe, IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2014 link : <https://www.iemed.org/publication/the-rise-of-the-far-right-in-europe/>



First : Extremist right-wing parties win election: New political maps in Europe

Chart: Europe's far-right parties during the 2019 elections



Affiliation to groups in the European Parliament

- ECR** European Conservatives and Reformists
- ENF** Europe of nations and freedom
- NI** European Conservatives and Reformists
- EFDD** Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy
- EPP** European People Party

From Hungary to Austria, Sweden to France and finally Italy, far-right parties and their alliances have found, in waves of migration, economic and social unrest, declining purchasing power and the energy crisis as a result of the Russo-Ukrainian war, a fertile environment for spawning and growth in light of the historical decline of left-wing parties, the absence of natural immunity and vaccines necessary for the rest of the European centrist parties to curb this rapid infection and the spread of the phenomenon of extreme right-wing alliances.

Like the rapidly contagious "corona variants", far-right alliances in several European countries have recently become rapidly contagious and have spread like wildfire, achieving considerable "mobility", accumulating success after success⁽²⁾.

What Europe knows is similar in global structures and trends, with most countries in the world now having fertile ground for far-right policies, including areas that have long been considered "immune" to them, such as Ireland, Portugal, Canada, and Spain. Moreover, the far-right landscape extends in the form of a contagion that is pervasive and spreading, beyond Western Europe. It also grew and flourished extensively in Central and Eastern Europe during the first decade of the 21st century. The far right has a historical and contemporary presence in Latin America, South Asian countries such as India, Indonesia, Myanmar and Turkey, as well as in industrialized countries such as Australia, Israel, Japan, South Africa and the United States of America. Within this global scenario, the far right is characterized by different variants of a common ideological core, and contains many parallel structures and organizations, where extreme right-wing politics ignores the distinction between different patterns of political participation, where right-wing groups combine traditional party membership with non-traditional (if not violent) forms of activism, left-wing issues and extreme right-wing ideas, as well as traditional images and the exploitation of narrow cultural symbols and identities⁽³⁾.

Over the past years, European politics has undergone several turns, which have led to a significant change in its general features as a result of the rise of the nationalist trend and the forces of the extreme right in the face of democracies.

These shifts will undoubtedly affect the map of European politics, internally and externally, and will result in new shifts of alliances that did not exist before, while other alliances will come to an end. These shifts also cast a shadow over the Middle East region, whose relations with Europe are expected to be subject to rearrangement.

(2) Abdulmajid Daqneesh: After Hungary, Austria and Sweden What is the impact of the far-right's victory in Italy on Europe's unity? Dated 2022 09 .29, Link:

(3) [https://www.aljazeera.net/politics/29/9/2022/ % D%8 %8A7](https://www.aljazeera.net/politics/29/9/2022/%D%8%A7)

Pietro Castelli Gattinara, Eviane Leidig, and Jacob Aasland Ravndal: What characterizes the far right scene in Europe and beyond? The link

<https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/groups/compendium/what-characterizes-the-far-right-scene-in-Europe-and-beyond.html>

Since the beginning of 2022, the extreme right has registered a historic rise in the circles of power in Hungary, Austria, Sweden and France, up to Italy, where the leader of the extreme right, Georgia Meloni, won the legislative elections held in the country in October 2022, which raises many fears of the policies of the extreme right on several files, most notably "immigration"⁽⁴⁾.

A right-wing populist wave swept the EU from 2015 to 2020, with Poland electing a hard-right government, and then the following year saw the UK leave the EU in 2016. This was followed by the election of right-wing populist governments in Austria and Italy, and Hungary re-elected Viktor Orban's party in 2018. Poland then re-elected the same government in 2019. Although this⁽⁵⁾ wave has already ended, it is clear that a second wave has begun to escalate during 2022, possibly threatening the foundations of the European Union. However, if the proponents of European unity and integration want to understand how to deal with this second wave and prevent its escalation⁽⁶⁾, they must first identify and explain the real causes of the first wave of the rise of the extreme right.

Initially, the EU institutions, and many European media, responded to this first wave of populist success by turning a blind eye. It squandered early opportunities to demonstrate that EU institutions function democratically during the EU parliamentary elections in 2019. While the leader of the largest elected party was expected to become president of the European Commission, leaders instead chose Germany's then-defence minister, Ursula von der Leyen - who was neither a candidate nor, at least, a well-known political figure – and many voters felt they were not democratically represented.

Voter discontent with immigration is also considered a motive and⁽⁷⁾ a key driver in many electoral entitlements. This factor has often been ignored and criticized as nothing more than the rise of racism, with the media attributing most of the victories of the right to mere misinformation. After doing nothing to bring about real change, at the moment when there was the shortest pause in populist victories from early 2020 to early 2022 - amid the COVID-19 pandemic - the analysts themselves failed to explain how the populist wave that had already spread in Europe and other regions of the world ended⁽⁸⁾.

(4) Rasha Ammar: What are the repercussions of the rise of the extreme right in Europe on the Middle East? On 2022/10/06 Link: <https://hafryat.com/en/blog/8>

(5) Antony Constantini, Understanding Europe's shift to the right, the link, September, 2022, 30 <https://www.politico.eu/article/understanding-europes-shift-to-the-right>

(6) Griff witt and Lisa Beck, Austria turns sharply to the right in an election shaped by immigration, the link <https://wapo.st/3pe6OiM>

(7) Yacsha Mounk, We Might Have Reached Peak Populism, July 2021, 7 the Link: <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/07/2021/peak-populism/619368>

(8) L'identité nationale : un marqueur idéologique central du FN et du RN, 21 October 2021, <https://bit.ly/3LK40la>

Second: The most important far-right parties in Europe

The National Front of France

1-The National Front of France

The National Front is a right-wing French political party founded in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen as the National Front for French Unity (FNU), of which he remained president until January 2011. The movement has been led by Jordan Bardella since November 5, 2022. It is a model of political parties seeking to protect French identity. This is called "national preference." The theme of national identity, the centre piece of confrontational programs, is the fabric which unites the ideological structure of the party's identities.

These political indicators are linked to the "anti-immigration" associated with insecurity. It is a matter of prioritizing, protecting and preserving French identity, which will not include French North Africans or Muslims, who are seen as an internal threat, as a corollary, of fear of the disintegration of French identity. The dominance of foreign identity⁽⁹⁾.

According to political activist Jean-Yves Le Gallo, Islam is not only a religion, but also "a set of social practices that tend to impose their rituals and principles on society as a whole and contribute to the questioning and destruction of part of French identity. For this far-right theorist who supports the idea of "national preference", Islam makes immigrants different and contrary to French identity, as Islam shows a desire not to be integrated into the French cultural fabric and identities⁽¹⁰⁾.

2-Alternative for Germany (AfD)

Before the emergence of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in 2013 as an anti-euro and anti-Greek bailout party, Germany had not seen the rise of any successful right-wing populist movement⁽¹¹⁾.

(9) Idem

(10) Dalia Maran: The rise of the far right in Germany and the possibility of resisting it, link: <https://bit.ly/3B6MBYj>

(11) The World Bank Report, the link: Trade (% of GDP) – Germany | Data (worldbank.org)

Because trade as a share of GDP had already stagnated since the 2008 financial crisis⁽¹²⁾, the party quickly shifted its focus to xenophobic and anti-immigrant policies.

The AfD's political course reflects its popularity in Eastern Germany, where it won 27.5% and 23.5% in Saxony and Brandenburg, respectively - nearly double its share in the West German states. This disparity has its roots in the period preceding reunification in 1990, when the West German Government liberalized trade with East Germany overnight⁽¹³⁾.

3- Forza Nova:

The cornerstone of Forza Nova's conservative ideology⁽¹⁴⁾ is better reflected in its slogan "Italians first" Forza Nova promotes ethnic Italian population growth and seeks to ban abortion and restore the Catholic Church as the official church of the Italian Republic. Forza Nova also opposes same-sex marriage and adoption by same-sex couples. One of her most famous campaigns, which denounced homosexuals in Italy, was through billboards.

Forza Nova is trying to push for the deportation of new immigrants from Italy and prevent further immigration to the country. The group delivers speeches and puts up billboards around Italian cities, warning residents of the dangers of migration, noting that migrants will bring "scabies, meningitis, tuberculosis and Ebola" to Italy. After Mada Kapopo, a Ghanaian immigrant, killed an Italian citizen with an axe in May 2013, Forza Nova launched a campaign titled "Immigration Kills." "Migration kills" billboards show images of migrants convicted of violent crimes, their images splattered in blood. "Who will die next?" on posters and billboards.

Anti-Semitism is also a key element of Forza Nova's ideology. In June 2008, Forza Nova president Roberto Fiori spoke of his support for then-Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Asked about his brief conversation with Ahmadinejad, Fury said: "We at Forza Nova are against any war event that the American Jewish lobby wishes against the Iranian people."

(12) Dalia Maran: Previous reference.

(13) counter extremism project, Forza Nuova, the link :

<https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/forza-nuova/report>

(14) Italian Northern League, Link:

<https://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/movementsandparties/22/3/2015/>

Hours before his arrival in Rome, Ahmadinejad stated that Israel would “disappear from the geographical scene.” Forza Nova leader Roberto Fiori also publicly denounced the US wars allegedly initiated by “the people who put Christ on the cross.”

Individuals from Forza Nuova and Casapound filed a lawsuit in the Rome Court of First Instance against Facebook after it removed their content carrying hate speech, claiming that the removal of users' pages was illegal and a violation of their right to freedom of expression. On February 23, 2020, the court issued a ruling upholding the removals, claiming that hate speech was not protected by the right to freedom of expression, and that Facebook had the right to take action based on its terms of service.

4- Lega Nord:

The Italian Northern League, whose full name is the Northern League for the Independence of Padania, was founded in 1989 following a merger of the Lombarda and Vanita leagues. Politician Umberto Bossi was one of the most prominent founders of the League, which included political formations from northern⁽¹⁵⁾ and central Italy, a far-right populist Italian political party that emerged in 2018 on anti-immigration policies and espouses the slogan “Italians first”. Umberto Bossi founded the League in the 1990s to represent northern Italians. He campaigned on the idea of gaining independence for the region of northern Italy he called Padania.

In the latter half of the 20th century, the economic gap between the agricultural south of Italy and the industrial north widened dramatically; thus many southern Italians migrated to the north. Bossi began to blame southern Italians for the economic hardships in northern Italy, regularly demeaning people as lazy parasites living on hard-working northerners and adopting a racist, xenophobic attitude.

(15) Brothers of Italy Fratelli d'Italia, European conservatives and reformists the link: https://ecrgroup.eu/ecr/party/brothers_of_italy

5- The Brothers of Italy:

Founded in 2012, Fratelli d'Italia is an emerging force in Italian politics where the party increased its voting share during the 2018 national elections and the 2019 European elections. It promotes respect for sovereignty and national unity, emphasizes the importance of a fair, sustainable and modern tax system, and defends the need for security, the rule of law and social cohesion⁽¹⁶⁾.

The party was founded as a successor to the National Alliance, which rose from the ashes of the 1946-1995 Italian social movement formed by members of the National Fascist Party led by dictator Benito Mussolini. The party's leader, Meloni, denies any connection to Mussolini's ideas but is careful not to condemn his rule. "Meloni has been active in post-fascist politics since her youth," said Piero Ignazi, an emeritus professor at the University of Bologna and an expert on the Brothers of Italy: "The identity of the party is, for the most part, linked to the post-fascist tradition. Her platform, however, blends this tradition with some mainstream conservative ideas and neoliberal elements such as free enterprise⁽¹⁷⁾."

(16) Far Right Invades Europe Politically Causes and Consequences - File, European Center for Counterterrorism and Intelligence Studies Link:

<https://www.europarabct.com/%D%85%9D%84%9D%-81%9A%7D%8B%3D8%9A>

(17) Pietro Castelli Gattinara, Eviane Leidig, and Jacob Aasland Ravndal: What characterizes the far right scene in Europe and beyond?

<https://bit.ly/42Fi8CW>

Third : A new wave of right-wing rise in Europe

The success of many far-right parties in the elections is due to several reasons, the most important of which is the use of many right-wing currents to rapprochement with citizens and to maintain popularity and electoral efficiency after these political currents failed to solve many crises, especially the global health crisis "Covid 19" and the state of economic confinement and austerity policies and isolationist measures. The main political sphere of the contemporary extreme right appears to be the national local arenas. Most far-right actors run in national elections, organizing around recognized national leaders, and rallying around (alleged) national values and causes. A typical example of these parties is the French National Rally, led by Marine Le Pen (formerly the National Front founded by Jean-Marie Le Pen), but more recent examples include Fox and its leader Santiago Abascal in Spain.

While national public policies remain the primary conduit for mobilization and the core of the political struggle of right-wing parties, the far-right started to move beyond the narrow national framework to the international dimension to the supranational and transnational ranges. Parties such as France's National Rally and the Danish People's Party, for example, have leveraged supranational institutions such as the European Parliament to build international ties and partnerships.

In addition, a revival of cross-country mobilization against migrants and refugees has continued in recent years, with the rapid spread of the European Identity Network, the emulation of Pegida marches outside Germany, and the emergence of citizen street patrols. Following the Scandinavian model of Odin's soldiers,

some extreme right-wing narratives, particularly white supremacy and male supremacy, have effectively transcended national boundaries to become transnational. Global networks such as the so-called "counter-jihad" movement have particularly benefited from the growing availability of online spaces that allow greater communication between far-right and anti-Islamic individuals, stretching from Europe to North America to Asia⁽¹⁸⁾.

(18) Emmanuel Macron admits that he “failed to stem” the vote in favour of the extremes during his mandate, le journal Le Monde,

Emmanuel Macron admits that he “failed to stem” the vote in favor of the extremes during his mandate (lemonde.fr)

In France, for example, by the end of his first term, Macron had acknowledged his failure to limit the power of extremist currents. Macron's failure was a consecration of a 40-year-old right-wing success that, despite its different electoral outcomes, was an important political asset in the country and managed to⁽¹⁹⁾ enter institutions even though it was theoretically against the political system. His efforts in the last elections were crowned with important results, as well as Le Pen, who fought the last run-off against Macron, there is also Eric Zemmour, who won about 2.5 million votes, in addition to Nicolas Dupont Enyon. In the end, the trio got up to a third of the French voters, a big and frightening achievement at the same time.

The French media contributed to the process of normalization with extremist ideologies, even fascism, and Macron's policies contributed to the pervasiveness of the political scene and extremism through a set of laws and actions targeting immigrants and Muslims, which became ideas that are seen as fascist political projects of the Republican right and the centre, such as the idea of establishing a ministry for immigration and national identity⁽²⁰⁾.

The French President has contributed to the creation of a political climate tolerant of all racist ideas and has made friends with far-right figures such as Philippe de Villiers, a former State Secretary close to Marion Mar»chal Le Pen, who later joined the Zemmour campaign. Indeed, Zemmour himself has said that Macron told him privately that⁽²¹⁾ he agrees with a number of his ideas, chief among them his belief in the theory of the "great replacement" and the danger of Islam in France to the identity of the State and society. Macron also allowed his ministers to engage in discussions about a "leftist-Islamist" front working against the interests of the republic, and his interior minister, Gerard Darmanin, even accused Le Pen herself of not being serious and resolute in the face of the "Islamist threat". Macron's men did not hesitate to engage in any discussion of the fascist trend⁽²²⁾.

(19) The presidential election will mark the victory of the normalization of the far right the link:

The presidential election will mark the victory of the normalization of the far right – Lib»ration (liberation.fr)

(20) Ellin Salvi, Far right: Macron calls to extinguish the embers on which he blew, the Link:

Far right: Macron calls to extinguish the embers on which he blew | Mediapart

(21) Zemmour recounts a conversation with the head of state: a "marketing" coup according to Macron, le parisien , the link:

Zemmour recounts a conversation with the head of state: a "marketing" coup according to Macron-Le Parisien

(22) Despite Macron's victory. How did the far-right win the French election? Link

<https://www.aljazeera.net/midan/reality/politics/%258/4/2022B%7D%8B%1D81%9>

The October 2022 parliamentary elections marked a watershed moment in Italy's history, with the arrival of a far-right government led by major conservatives Giorgia Meloni, the leader of Italy's Brothers and its populist ally Matteo Salvini, the leader of the League, achieving a decisive victory on the deeply divided centre-left.

It is Italy's first experience with far-right rule since fascist dictator Benito Mussolini, after 69 ideologically diverse governments since World War II. Many Italians fear curbing personal freedoms and shrinking the space for democracy. Others fear that the relatively inexperienced mainstream of the Italian fraternity, which leads the Alliance, lacks the competence to navigate Italy's governmental experience and meet its current economic challenges⁽²³⁾.

Both Meloni, an activist conservative who began her political career as a youth activist in the neo-fascist Italian social movement, and Salvini, who was a huge admirer of Russian President Vladimir Putin, are skeptics of the EU project. They have been highly critical of the Union – describing Brussels bureaucrats as agents of "nihilistic global elites led by international financial institutions and groups" – both of which are threatening to leave the eurozone⁽²⁴⁾, although their hostile tone has been somewhat reduced after a successful election. There is also some disagreement from within the coalition government, with Meloni continuing Italy's position in support of Ukraine vis-à-vis Russia, while Salvini believes that Ukraine's support and continued alignment with the Western position should not be against the economic interests of the Italian people⁽²⁵⁾.

(23) Amy Kazmin, What an Italy led by the far-right might mean for Europe, Financial Times the Link: <https://www.ft.com/content/649d412-8013-7326d84-f97-3fc3a5069e3>

(24) Amy Kazmin, Idem

(25) Matt Golder, Far Right Parties in Europe, Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 497-19:477 (Volume publication date May 2016) the link: <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci012441-042814->

Fourth: The victory of populism is a reaction to the failure of traditional parties to govern

Many studies link the success of many far-right parties in Europe to the changing nature of partisan competition. Under these circumstances, voters are turning to populist parties, including those on the far right, that criticize mainstream parties for colluding with them rather than vying for power. Because rapprochement removes the political character from the basic (economic) dimension that is the domain of competition between parties, and voters also resort to parties that compete on the dimensions of alternative policies.

The second proposition is that far-right parties work best when the main right-wing parties adopt centrist positions because the far-right has more political space to exploit them. The evidence for each of these claims is varied and there are those who consider that this has no impact on the growth of the extreme right⁽²⁶⁾.

Some analysts link the success of the far right to recent economic crises and disappointments, and usually offer explanations in terms of realistic conflict theory (Campbell 1965). In times of economic scarcity, social groups with conflicting material interests compete for limited and scarce resources. Far-right parties can exploit the failure of economic policies under right-wing and left-wing governments that have failed to achieve their goals by linking immigrants and minorities to economic hardship and moving slogans such as “end unemployment” and “stop migration.”

Many evidence supports this link between economic collapse and individual social discontent in Europe. It has come to describe the characteristics of the typical far-right voter, as an individual competing with migrants for economic opportunities, and these individuals are also associated with stronger anti-immigration tendencies and currents, and anti-immigrant attitudes, in turn, have been closely linked to support for the far-right⁽²⁷⁾.

(26) Matt Golder, *Idem*

(27) Zachary B. Wolf, How the far right is surging in Europe, September 2022, 26 the link: <https://edition.cnn.com/26/09/2022/politics/europe-far-right-what-matters/index.html>

In recent years, right-wing parties have exploited the coronavirus crisis to fuel discontent among citizens, due to the government's lack of response to the coronavirus pandemic, and the widespread of misinformation, using social media, which provided more space for far-right and conservative xenophobic political ideas, and exploited that point to promote anti-immigrant ideas as transmitters of infection. This quickly became evident in Italy after the first elections since the Corona crisis. The Ukrainian war has now helped to increase the nationalist sentiment and identities of a large section of Europeans. It is a major factor in the aggravation of the situation, and the transmission of right-wing contagion to countries such as Sweden and Italy.

The strength of Europe's far-right parties, which are growing, also lies in hitherto successful mobilization strategies amplified by government mistakes, seen by some as more flexible in regulation, their elites more reactive to current social changes, and they have a greater capacity to adapt to those changes. As Marine Le Pen did in France after losing the 2017 election, she removed her father from the presidency of the party, and announced that she did not support his policy, and the result was that she became a strong competitor in the recent elections.

The far right has succeeded in adopting a discourse that links the economic, financial and social problems that have emerged in Europe since 2008 to security problems and terrorist threats, especially those resulting from immigration and the influx of refugees, while promoting its determination to find solutions to those problems. All of the above has led to a widening of the popular base of right-wing parties in the most important countries of the European continent.

Fifth: Ideological and Intellectual Unifying interconnections of the Far Right Project in Europe

Is it possible to talk about the left, right and centre parties' exhaustion of their attractiveness and ideological resources in the face of the narrative of the extreme right in its hostility to the European project, xenophobia and the negative attitude towards immigration, or is it beyond the ideological framework and the conflict of ideas and demagoguery and its impact on peoples to what is economic and social policies, as the extreme right exploits the failure of traditional parties in Europe to manage the economic and social crisis during the health crisis and beyond, especially in light of the Russian-Ukrainian war and the European Union's preoccupation with everything military and security to avoid the collapse of Ukraine and its fall into the hands of the Russians?

The positions of far-right politicians are similar across Europe: they are against liberal democracy and prefer democracy of the more populist or authoritarian type. They often emphasize religious identity and the importance of Christian nationalism, as well as the important role of the family ⁽²⁸⁾ "

The right wing associated with Trump, the former American president had things in common with the European right. Meloni has received vocal support from Steve Bannon, Trump's former White House adviser who was indicted in New York for his role in a scheme to fund a wall on the US southern border with Mexico in particular, and encourages the Italian prime minister to throw migrants into the sea.

The most important features of the European far right are hostility to immigrants, Euroscepticism, and populism. The far right sees itself as representative of the silent majority that political elites are thought to have ignored for long periods.

Martin Schultz defines the far right as radical, nationalist, anti-Semitic, and sows hate speech and phobia against Islam and Muslims. Some experts believe it includes populism, authoritarianism, and native citizenship (Maud, 2007).

(28) Seyed Nader Nourbakhsh, Seyyed Abbas Ahmadi, Qiuomars Yazdanpanah Dero and Abdolreza Faraji: Rise of the Far Right parties in Europe: from Nationalism to Euroscepticism – Ageopolitics Quarterly, Volume: 18, No 4, Winter 2023 page 55 the link: http://journal.iag.ir/article_6_129481e23e152c58ba9f4e04dbf7072dbdcf0.pdf

Yael Tamir points out that the main problem today is a clash between nationalism and neoliberal globalization. Nationalists want states to intervene in the economic market in order to defend their citizens. Ignazi adds that the far right traditionally opposes representative democracy.

In addition, these parties are against ideas such as equality, and may take an authoritarian approach more often than not. One of the consequences of the rise of the extreme right is the control of borders, which means that national security, national interests and national identity require caution against the danger coming from immigration and foreigners⁽²⁹⁾.

Most far-right parties are also populist. In the end, populism is nothing more than the prevalence of an “us versus them” mentality or, as Maud describes it, a “weakly centred ideology,” an idea that only creates the basic structure of a society divided into two homogeneous and opposing groups: a “pure” society of people against a “corrupt” elite. In this context, institutions are seen as interdependent entities that are concerned only with their own well-being and not with the interests of broad groups of people.

According to Betz, populism has a vital role to play in the ideology of the far right. The referendum could restrict, as a popular solution, the rights of minorities such as Muslims. Mueller believes that populism, sometimes seen as an acronym for “criticizing elites,” is the claim that they alone represent what they call the “real people” or “silent majority.” All other contenders for power are declared illegitimate and anti-legitimacy.

Extremist nationalism is another characteristic that goes against the principle of equality between human beings, and in some cases leads to a tendency towards racism. Successful far-right parties have tried to focus on national and cultural identity rather than biological racism. They believe that national identity is threatened by flows of migrants and minorities (Carter, 2005). The far right concludes that only the native citizen of the nation should be at the top of the priorities of social service (Gebernau, 2010: 12). Rydgren also assumes that these parties benefit from xenophobic trends in society. Extremist nationalism is therefore a challenge to the process of European integration⁽³⁰⁾.

(29) idem, page 56

(30) Ankita Dutta Rising Euroscepticism in Europe: An Assessment, | 25 September 2018 the Link: https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=2495&lid=1872

Far-right parties are also coming together to question the EU, and the most comprehensive definition of EU skepticism has been provided by Paul Taggart and Alex Szerbiak. For them, skepticism in Europe can be defined in two ways - “hard skepticism” and “soft skepticism.” The first refers to principled opposition to the EU and to European integration in general, as evidenced by political parties calling for their countries' withdrawal from the EU membership. These parties usually recommend rebuilding relations between their countries and the European Organization in contravention of legislation and policies within the Union, implying active opposition to EU membership.

On the other hand, soft skepticism in Europe refers to opposition to one or a number of EU policies and does not imply a principled objection to the concept of European integration or EU membership. Soft parties skeptical of the EU express conditional opposition to it, for example, based on opposition to an issue or matter of national interest. This characterization of Euroskepticism, soft or hard, provides an approach from which to understand the different features and variables of Euroskepticism⁽³¹⁾.

Skeptical parties in the EU tend to view European integration as a phenomenon of bureaucratic creep and elitism, and have been critical of the regressive nature of the European integration process. Accordingly, skepticism undermines the integrity of the Union, the concept of regional cooperation and the values of solidarity, while upholding the values of the nation-state, national identity⁽³²⁾ and State sovereignty. The main reasons that contributed to skepticism in Europe were the ideas that integration weakened national sovereignty and the nation-state; according to this trend, the European Union was highly bureaucratic and elite-driven; encouraged high levels of immigration; or was simply a neo-liberal organization that benefited a business elite at the expense of the working class⁽³³⁾.

The Euro Barometer survey of EU citizens shows that confidence in this regional bloc and its institutions has been declining since its peak in 2007. Since then, the percentage has dropped to less than 50%. A 2009 poll showed that support for EU membership was lowest in Latvia, the United Kingdom and Hungary. By 2016, the countries that looked skeptically at the feasibility and role of the EU were Greece, France, Spain and the UK.

(31) Idem

(32) Standard Eurobarometer 89, “Europeans and the future of Europe”, Spring 2018, <https://bit.ly/44QfDzU>

(33) The Rise of European Populism and the Collapse of the Centre Left, Brookings, 8 March 2018, <https://bit.ly/3nPo6T8>

A referendum on the UK's continued membership of the EU was held in 2016, resulting in a 51.9% vote to leave the EU. Since then, confidence in the EU has risen slightly in most of its member states as a result of low unemployment and accelerated economic growth. According to Euro Barometer spring 2018 surveys, two-thirds of Europeans believe their country has benefited from being an EU member, the highest percentage since 1983 and an increase of three percentage points since 2017. In addition, 60% of Europeans think that membership in the EU has made many achievements for their countries. EU support levels rose in 26 of the bloc's 28 member states - with the exception of Germany and the United Kingdom, which recorded a 2% drop in support. However, when it comes to trusting European institutions in the long run, many Europeans believe that the Union is going in the wrong direction (42%) more than the right direction (32%)⁽³⁴⁾.

The EU is deeply divided over how to shape its future. The 2016 Brexit referendum represents the worst-case scenario for the EU in terms of the impact of Euroskepticism. Britain had huge trade relations with the EU, where membership was valued in terms of costs and benefits. Moreover, Britain has often found EU policies incompatible with its interests. British politics has always included a political faction of conservatives, who have been skeptical of deeper integration with the rest of Europe. This faction grew strongly and confronted the EU in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.

The two most common arguments in favour of Brexit have focused on the failure of the EU's liberal rules for internal migration and onerous EU economic regulations. While the debate over economic regulation and the separation of EU and state sovereignty seems to dominate the intellectual case for Brexit, the political appeal of Brexit depends heavily on Britain's position on the immigration issue.

Brexit has not only changed the domestic political atmosphere, it has had crucial political ramifications within the EU and for its relations with other countries. It became clear after the Brexit vote that questioning the EU derives its strength from opposition to mass immigration, rejection of cultural alienation, and the supposed surrender of national sovereignty and its transformation into international bodies that do not reflect the interests of all States and are not reactive to incendiary issues of concern to the European citizen⁽³⁵⁾.

(34) Warda Abdel Razek, Implications of the Rise of the Far Right in Europe, 9 October 2022 Link: <https://rcssegyp.com/11912>

(35) The extreme right wing is sweeping Europe politically, the causes and repercussions, op. cit.

Sixth: The implications of the arrival of far-right parties on the political scene in Europe

The dominant feature of far-right groups and parties in general, whether they are parties within power or those opposed to them, are the horns that always talk about the existence of an ethnic or cultural threat against the European race, coming from groups that describe them as “outsiders” to society, and the need to preserve the national identity, and then comes the policy of the far-right that strongly opposes immigration and immigrants.

The right-wing parties consider themselves entrusted with defending Christian religion and values against other religions, which raises conflicts and criticism of other religions and their adherents, especially Islam, and thus continue to promote the idea that they constitute hotbeds of terrorism, which may lead to the rise of Islamophobia throughout Europe more and more, especially since the emergence of the extreme right in Europe coincided with the emergence of Islamophobia in European societies in recent years.

The fears of Muslim communities in Europe, or immigrants in general, may be compounded by the quest of some European governments in light of the rise of right-wing parties, and the broadening of the popular base supporting them day after day significantly, to outbid what the far-right parties put forward, by adopting a discourse that is identical to the discourse of those parties, in order to restore the electoral votes recently acquired by the right, which may prompt governments to take steps against Muslim communities to strengthen their position on the electoral street. A previous statement by the French president in late 2020 is a worrying signal about this, when he said that the Muslims of France constitute a "counter-society" and that Islam is facing "a crisis in various countries of the world." There are more than 6 million Muslims in France, according to official figures.

Having reached the rise of the radical right to the structures of the Union and especially the legislative authority represented by the European Parliament, this can be considered as a potential threat to the cohesion of the European Union, and will increase extremism in political circles in Europe in general, especially in light of the mutual coordination between right-wing blocs throughout the continent, as is the case between Poland, Italy and Hungary, Georgia Meloni (Prime Minister of Italy) has already expressed great appreciation for the policy of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.

Far-right parties have come together in the European Parliament to form a unified political bloc under the name Identity and Democracy (ID), a new group formed by members of the European Parliament that includes the following parties: National Rally, Vlaams Belang, Lega, Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, Dansk Folkeparti, Svoboda a prima demokracie, Alternative für Deutschland, Perussuomalaiset and Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond.

During the European elections in May 2019, around 200 million Europeans elected MEPs to represent them over the next five years in the new European Parliament. MEPs are organized into political groups based on their political affiliations. It has 65 members, making it the fifth largest group in Parliament⁽³⁶⁾.

In addition to the extreme right's rise to power in Europe reflected in the changing dynamics of the legislative decision within the European Parliament and the impact of the performance of governments on the future of European peoples through the return of protectionist policies, the spread of nationalist discourses and identity tendencies, the prevalence of hatred and discrimination on the basis of race, sex and religion, the call for the expulsion of migrants and the change of policies related to migration and migrants, the success of extreme right-wing parties generally affects European integration, attitudes and external relations with the international community.

(36) Ian Bremmer, These 5 Facts Explain the Worrying Rise of Europe's Far-Right, (Time, October 2015 .15), available at: <http://goo.gl/qg81Ba>

Seventh: Possible European policies towards the Middle East and North Africa in light of the rise of the extreme right

The steady and noticeable rise of right-wing currents in Europe raises many questions about the nature of the foreign policy that these currents will adopt towards the Middle East and North Africa in light of the refugee crises pressing on Europe, and the nature of the balances and map of political alliances that these currents will contribute to forming with the countries of the region.

The terrorist events that the European continent has been exposed to in the past period have contributed to creating an incubator environment for the growth of these currents, especially the consolidation of their negative view of migrants, particularly those coming from the conflict areas in the Middle East, which made these different currents agree that migrants threaten European nationalism through the Islamization of Europe, threatening European ideas based on secularism and separation of religion from the state, in addition to abusing the benefits of the welfare state (such as subsidy programs and others), according to right-wing thought {36}.

The most prominent files that these currents will seek to deal with in the region are as follows:

1. Migration and refugees:

The top priority of the European right-wing currents is the issue of migration of citizens of the Middle East and the flow of refugees to the countries of the European continent, especially from countries experiencing armed conflicts.

The majority of these currents share a refusal to receive migrants from all over the world, specifically from the Middle East and North Africa. Recently, European nationalist currents have adopted a hostile rhetorical tone towards Muslim migrants from the Middle East countries, because according to these currents, they threaten not only European security, but also European Christian identity, and add new economic burdens to most European countries.

This was evident in the positions adopted by the Alternative for Germany (AfD), the National Front (FN) in France, Freedom in Austria and the Netherlands, the People in Switzerland, and others, which considered that "Muslim refugees and migrants are a threat to European societies that must be confronted", and even some extremist voices continued to raise the slogans of "a Europe free of Islam"⁽³⁷⁾.

In addition, most of these parties reject the Turkey-EU agreement on the refugee file signed in March 2016 because it will not address the root of the problem at all as much as it will export it abroad. In addition, it opens the way for wider cooperation with Turkey and provides it with an opportunity to join the European Union at a later date, thus threatening European identity and nationalism⁽³⁸⁾.

Therefore, refugees from the Middle East are expected to suffer from more stringent policies on the part of those currents, which rely mainly on a number of elements mentioned by the leaders of these extremist currents, the most prominent of which are⁽³⁹⁾:

- (a) Completely close the border to new refugees entering European territory and instruct border guards to shoot at any migrant or refugee trying to enter the country illegally, said Frauke Petri, head of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party.
- (b) Stifle government subsidies for migrants, including health care and services for migrants, as well as reduce the number of asylum-seekers.
- (c) The closure of all Islamic schools in European countries, as well as Islamic associations that provide services to Muslim refugees and immigrants, with no more mosques allowed, and the practice of Islamic religion not allowed.

(37) The rise of Europe's far-right", TRT World, (June 2016 ,23), available at: <https://goo.gl/Kgq3Eu>

(38) Susi Dennison & Dina Pardijs, "The world according to Europe's insurgent parties: Putin, migration and people power", (European council on foreign relations, June 2016 ,23) available at: <https://goo.gl/VKDTEK>

(39) The new York times, "Europe's Rising Far Right: A Guide to the Most Prominent Parties", (the new York times, updated December 2016 ,4), available at: <https://goo.gl/fLrq1C>

This trend has been accompanied by a strong European popular trend of the need to return refugees to their lands and to abandon the humanitarian role of European countries in order to preserve European security and national identity. Despite confirmation by the majority of right-wing currents in Europe, the latter has not yet announced a clear strategy on how to deport refugees, whether they will be deported to their countries of origin, which may add burdens to the countries of the region, or refer them to an intermediary state in light of their continued rejection of the "Turkish-European" agreement.

The Russian-Ukrainian war is also a new milestone and a central shift in European countries' policy on migration and asylum, where priority will be given to receiving Ukrainian and Eastern European migrants, thus closing borders permanently to those coming from the Middle East, North Africa and other geographical regions, and reducing the proportion of legal migrants and the proportion of visas granted to citizens of these regions.

2-The position on the Syrian file

It is not expected that there will be a significant change in the positions of Western governments towards the Syrian regime and the shifts related to the Syrian file. The most important European countries no longer raise the slogan of Assad's departure, and they generally adhere to the strategy adopted by the European Union on April 3, 2017⁽⁴⁰⁾. This strategy fits into the EU's regional strategy for Syria and Iraq, as well as the threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

The strategic objectives pursued by the European Union in Syria are based on key areas, the most important of which are:

- Put an end to the war by embarking on a genuine political transition.
- Promote a constructive and inclusive democratic transition in Syria.
- Rescue civilians by addressing the humanitarian needs of Syrians.
- Promote democracy, human rights and freedom of expression.
- Moving legal accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

(40) Syrie: réponse de l'UE à la crise, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/policies/syria/>

In fact, the position of the European right-wing currents on the Syrian conflict is directly linked to the increasing flow of refugees to Europe, as these currents show a clear tendency to continue the Assad regime, as they believe that its continuation, with the cessation of material and military support for the internal Syrian opposition currents, may provide an opportunity to bring about a political settlement that would return the Syrian refugees to their lands.

This coincides with the support of those currents for cooperation with Russia, and the call for rapprochement with Russian President Vladimir Putin in order to find a way out of the Syrian crisis⁽⁴¹⁾, which may indicate, given the control of the right wing over Europe, the possibility of a deal between the European Union and Russia that would lift sanctions on the latter in exchange for pressure on the Assad regime to calm the situation in Syria to allow the return of refugees and rid Europe of that burden, especially with the rejection of the majority of right-wing parties of military intervention in Syria, and not being considered a solution on the table⁽⁴²⁾.

It can be said that the idea of rapprochement with Russia to solve the Syrian crisis is currently fading in light of the Russian-Ukrainian war, and this file is no longer of much concern to the European side, especially in light of the priority given to the Ukrainian file. Therefore, it can be considered that the Syrian situation is currently controlled by new regional calculations with the escalation of the Turkish role and its role in achieving a balance between the conflicting forces in Syria, paying more attention to securing the Syrian-Turkish border and controlling more the issue of the flow of refugees through Turkey to Eastern European countries.

3-The position on the Arab-Israeli conflict

Nationalist currents in Central and Western Europe are divided on how to deal with it; while some nationalist currents in Central Europe openly reject Israeli views and even accuse them, together with the global Jewish elite, of “enslaving the Palestinians” and controlling the US government's attitudes, Western European countries are pro-Israel, believing that the threats to Israeli and European security stem from Islam, and that they are fighting the same war, which makes it necessary for Europe to support Israel⁽⁴³⁾.

(41) Leonid Ragozin, “Putin's Hand Grows Stronger as Right-Wing Parties Advance in Europe”, (Bloomberg, March 2016 ,15), available at: <https://goo.gl/kN8o6f>

(42) Susi Dennison & Dina Pardijs, “The world according to Europe's insurgent parties: Putin, migration and people power”, op cit

(43) Yehuda Ben-Hur Levy, “The Undiplomats: Right-wing populists and their foreign policies”, (Center for European Reform, August 2015), p6. Available at: <https://goo.gl/3WaoIq>

Arguably, there is an undeclared bargain on which the relationship between Israel and the right-wing populist currents in Europe is based: fascists and Nazis can praise the killing of Jews and glorify their victory over them, but only if Israel's interests are defended within the EU, which is consistent with an earlier statement by Netanyahu in which he aims at striking a balance in his country's relationship with the EU in the isolation it suffers from due to Europe's failure to adopt all its stands on a number of issues⁽⁴⁴⁾.

Israel therefore expects from its new allies backing in the EU. For its part, the right-wing movements see in Israel an amazing model for the country they dream of. It is an ethno-nationalist state that firmly controls its borders and successfully fortifies itself in a hostile area. In addition, the fascists show some sympathy for Tel Aviv because the occupying state shares with Europe the Jewish Christian heritage, which is considered the right-wing spearhead in the cultural and religious war with the Islamic Orient, so preserving it is one of the most important weapons in this battle.

In addition to sharing hate to Islam and Islamophobia, another good reason for the European right to ally itself with Zionism is the desire to take advantage of the military and technological arsenal which is tested and tried on the ground by the occupying power. The far-right to dealing savagely with refugees. This “fascist utopia” is actually realised in Israel, which has been dealing with an “open bullet” policy towards the Palestinians since 1948 until the present day. Such a behaviour prompted someone like Marcel Yaron Gulhammer, a German convert to Judaism, to describe his service in the Israeli occupation army with the most beautiful experiences of his life, after he laid down his weapon and returned home to fight in the ranks of the “Alternative for Germany” party, calling for the expulsion of Muslims from the country so that Germany would not be surrounded by its enemies as it happens in Israel, as he described it⁽⁴⁵⁾.

However, at the EU level, these right-wing governments are also not expected to move the stalled peace process between Palestinians and Israelis since 2014, and their positions on Israel do not deviate much from the positions of the classic parties in Europe, most of which support Israel and work to ensure that its interests continue with it at the expense of the rights of the Palestinian people.

The arrival of Israel's far-right government, led by Netanyahu, could also dash all hopes of a settlement and a two-state solution in accordance with UN resolutions.

(44) Al-Mahdi Al-Zidawi: The European Right and Israel. The story of "forbidden love" targeting Arabs and Muslims, link:

<https://www.aljazeera.net/midan/reality/politics/14/12/2021>

(45) Von Charlys Hawly: Europe's Right-Wing Populists Find Allies in Israel the link:

<https://bit.ly/3nVINN7>

Thus, the European position on developments in the situation in the Palestinian territories - although relatively different from the American position - is unlikely to contribute to supporting the historical rights of the Palestinian people, promoting the peace process and stopping the Israeli settlement policy. Moreover, what rather combines the neo-European fascism and Israeli racism are many common populist denominators on top their hate for Islam and Muslims.

4- Position on Iran

EU interests related to Iran include maintaining stability in the Gulf region, which remains a highly important region for oil supply and its global prices; resolving conflicts in the Middle East, with the aim of avoiding further refugee flows to Europe as a result of instability and collapse; diversifying EU energy supplies by increasing Iranian imports and reducing Europe's heavy reliance on energy from Russia; and boosting its industrial commodity exports by expanding economic relations with Iran at a time when European growth rates have been low over the past decade⁽⁴⁶⁾.

European relations with Iran are also a real dilemma for Europe's rising right-wing political currents. At a time when these currents need Iran to settle the Syrian crisis, which may contribute to stopping the flow of refugees to Europe on the one hand, and supplying it with energy on the other hand, European countries are concerned that the upcoming developments in the Middle East will lead to a wide war in light of the faltering implementation of the nuclear agreement after the withdrawal of the American party under President Trump and the failure of the present US administration to reach an acceptable formula for returning to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 5 +1 (JCPOA) as Iran continues its nuclear tests⁽⁴⁷⁾, which may negatively affect regional and European security.

Thus, right-wing political currents may seek to maintain balanced relations with Iran to ensure Iranian support in the field of energy, and pressure on the other hand not to object to the nuclear deal, to ensure that there are no other security tensions in the region that affect European security directly related to security in the Middle East.

(46) Ali Fathullah-Nejad, Europe and the future of Iran policy: Dealing with a dual crisis Monday, October ,22 2018 the link:
<https://bit.ly/44OVz0l>

(47) HOMAS Burrows, "Trump's Iran stance could threaten a world war and the destruction of Israel, warns Tehran as it cautions the Donald against 'provoking' them in the Middle East", (DailyMail, December .12 2016), available at: <https://goo.gl/3tJlpK>

Conclusion

It is likely that the rise of the European right will push to reshape the map of political alliances in Europe, both at the legislative and executive level and set priorities for European governments that are struggling on the one hand to correct the course of European integration, especially as right-wing currents stand skeptical of the European Union. At the same time; however, they cannot change the rules of the political game completely and try to take advantage of the Union to get out of economic and social crises, but without abandoning sovereign national aspirations and their positions on immigration and immigrants.

At the international level, these governments cannot change the reality of alliances with many Middle Eastern countries, but may rather register a great rapprochement with many authoritarian and patriarchal regimes in the region, although the nature of these alliances and their repercussions on both sides, whether European or Middle Eastern, are still very unclear, and their features will remain hostage to future developments, especially at the level of attractiveness of European interests and their increasing needs for oil and gas in light of the Russian-Ukrainian war. This makes European governments probably bet on the Middle East countries for benefiting from the economic benefits of the region on the one hand, and for ensuring stability and security in it to control and reduce irregular migration and the flow of refugees to Europe on the other.



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